OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIMS UNDER
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORMS
Fred H. Kumpf*
The workers' compensation amendments of 19791 represent the
most comprehensive reforms in the history of New Jersey's workers'
compensation laws.2 Five revisions in particular will have the effect
of greatly restricting the compensability of occupational disease
claims. While it is axiomatic that this legislation cannot be construed
except within the context of the factual setting in an actual case, as of
this writing no reported decisions have interpreted the amendments as
they pertain to this type of compensation claim. 3 For this reason,
many questions raised by the language in the reform Act remain
unanswered. 4 Cognizance of these issues is, however, central to any
determination regarding the breadth of reform. This article will examine the principal revisions concerning the compensability of occupational disease claims brought under the new law. In turn, the
amended definition of "compensable occupational disease" and the
new definition of "permanent partial disability" 6 will be discussed.
Consideration will then be given to the revised jurisdiction of the
workers' compensation court, 7 and to the supplementary employer

* Judge of Compensation, Division of Workers' Compensation, Department of Labor and
Industry, State of New Jersey.
1 1979 N.J. Pub. L. Nos. 283, 285 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 to : 1595 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982)).
' New Jersey's first workers' compensation system was approved by Governor \Voodrow
Wilson on April 4, 1911, with an effective date of July 4, 1911. Although there have been many
significant changes since the passage of that Act, none were on such a scale as the recent
amendments formulated through the cooperative activity of state legislators and representatives
of both the business and labor communities. The dominant theme of this legislation is to -make
available additional dollars for benefits to seriously disabled workers while eliminating, clarifying, or tightening awards of compensation based upon minor permanent partial disabilities not
related to the employment." SENATE LABOR, INDUSTRY, AND PROFESSIONS COMM., JOINT STATEMENT TO SENATE COMM. SUBSTITUTE FOB N.J. SENATE No. 802 AND ASSEMBLY COMM. SUBSTITUTE
FOR N.J. ASSEMBLY No. 840 (Nov. 13, 1979) [hereinafter referred to as JOINT STATEMENT].
3 Williams v. Western Elec. Co., 178 N.J. Super. 571, 421 A.2d 1063 (App. Div. 1981). a
recent case concerning the compensability of an occupational disease claim, was decided under
the prior statutory language.
4 In fact, through the first fifteen months following the inception of the amendments, only
two percent of all formal compensation case determinations were based on the new law. Nev
JERSEY DET oF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, A REPORT ON THE WORKES' COMPENSATION AMENDMENTS
OF 1979, at 7 (July 1, 1981).
s See notes 9-37 infra and accompanying text.
* See notes 43-50 infra and accompanying text.
7 See aotes 51-67 infra and accompanying text.
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defenses provided by the reform Act.8 Finally, the application of the
new schedule to multiple occupational disabilities will be contrasted
with the schedule's application to disabilities flowing from a single
accident."
COMPENSABLE OCCUPATIONAL DxSEASE REDEFINED

The amendment of section 34:15-31 of the New Jersey Statutes
Annotated 9 may substantially reduce the conditions recognized as
occupational diseases, and will require a reexamination of each of the
conditions previously assumed to be compensable as a matter of
course. Each alleged occupational disease must now be measured
against a new and more restrictive yardstick of compensability. 0
Formerly, the statute recognized two types of occupational diseases: those which were "due to causes and conditions which are or
were characteristic of or peculiar to a particular trade, occupation,
process or employment," and those which were "due to the exposure
of any employee to a cause thereof arising out of and in the course of
his employment."" Most significantly, under the amended definition
of occupational disease, the latter category of diseases is entirely eliminated from the statute.' 2 Additionally, the remaining category has
been altered in two prominent respects. An occupational disease must
now be "due in a material degree to causes and conditions which are
or were characteristic of our peculiar to a particular trade, occupation
or place of employment," ' 3 and degenerative changes of body tissues
or organs "due to the natural aging process" are expressly excluded.14
It is unlikely that these changes will affect the doctrine of liberal
construction which our courts have applied to the concept of occupational disease. 15 Nor will the reforms militate against the broadly

See notes 68-69 infra and accompanying text.
' See notes 70-71 infra and accompanying text.
20 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-31 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
" Id. § 34:15-31 (West 1959) (amended 1980).
2, Id. § 34:15-31 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). This section now provides:
a. For the purposes of this article, the phrase "compensable occupational disease"
shall include all diseases arising out of and in the course of employment, which are
due in material degree to causes and conditions which are or were characteristic of
or peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, process or place of employment.
b. Deterioration of a tissue, organ or part of the body in which the functioning of
such tissue, organ or part of the body is diminished due to the natural aging process
theory is not compensable.

Id.
14 Id. § 34:15-31(a).
"4 Id. § 34:15-31(b).
,s See, e.g., Bond v. Rose Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co., 78 N.J. Super. 505, 513, 187 A.2d
353, 358 (App. Div. 1963).
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developed definition of "disease" as" 'any departure from the state of
health presenting marked symptons.' "16 Nevertheless, the coverage
afforded occupational claims will be substantially circumscribed. This
is especially evident as a result of the statutory deletion.
Many previously recognized compensable conditions were found
to be occupational diseases under the portion of the definition which
has been eliminated. These include most of the cases dealing with the
aggravation of latent defects such as Dupuytren's Contracture, 17 allergic bronchial asthma, 8 and dermititis.19 Indeed, the decision in
Bond v. Rose Ribbon & Carbon Manufacturing Co., 20 which recognized as compensable the activation of an employee's latent tuberculosis, relied on cases in which the diseases were found compensable
under the deleted portion of the definition. 21 Such authority has been
statutorily abrogated.
The remaining portion of the definition, which compensates
those diseases due to conditions peculiar to or characteristic of an
employment, describes a compensation policy philosophically similar
to the New York approach to occupational diseases.22 The practical
effect of the revision is best presented by an example. If an employee
contracted pneumonia as a result of working in a freezer as a packer,
the condition would be a compensable occupational disease because it
would be due to cause which is peculiar to the employment. If the
same employee contracted pneumonia as a result of incidental exposure to a fellow employee with pneumonia, however, this might not
be compensable because the condition may not be due to a condition

16 Giambattista v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 32 N.J. Super. 103, 113, 107 A.2d 801, 806
(App. Div. 1954) (quoting \VxaSTa's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.)).
17 See, e.g., Duncan v. T. I. McCormack Trucking Co., 43 N.J. Super. 352, 128 A.2d 722
(App. Div. 1956); Walsh v. Koler, 43 N.J. Super. 139, 127 A.2d 918 (Law Div. 1956), affd. 46
N.J. Super. 206, 134 A.2d 458 (App. Div. 1957) (Dupuytren's Contracture compensable despite
employee's predisposition for contraction).
18 See, e.g., Bober v. Independent Plating Corp., 28 N.J. 160, 145 A.2d 463 (1958) (employee with latent predisposition to allergic bronchial asthma activated by exposure to chrome
dust entitled to compensation).
IS See, e.g., Giambattista v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 32 N.J. Super. 103, 107 A.2d 801
(App. Div. 1954) (preexisting nonoccupational fungal condition aggravated by continual immersion in benzene held compensable).
.0 78 N.J. Super. 505, 189 A.2d 459 (App. Div. 1963), afJ'd, 42 N.J. 308, 200 A.2d 322
(1964).
21 Id. at 513-14, 189 A.2d at 463-64 (citing Bober v. Independent Plating Co., 28 N.J. 160,
145 A.2d 463 (1958)); Reynolds v. General Motors Corp., 40 N.J. Super. 484, 123 A.2d 555 (App.
Div. 1956); Giambattista v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 32 N.J. Super. 103, 107 A.2d 89 (App. Div.
1954)).
.2 Cf. Bolger v. Chris Anderson Roofing Co., 112 N.J. Super. 383, 393-95, 271 A.2d 451,
457-58 (Law Div. 1970), afJ'd, 117 N.J. Super. 497, 285 A.2d 228 (App. Div. 1971) (distinguishing prior New Jersey rule with provisions of New York law).
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characteristic of or peculiar to the employment. Such a condition
would have been compensable, of course, under the eliminated portion of the definition in the old Act. Therefore, beyond the requirement that an occupational disease arise out of and in the course of
employment, it must also be peculiar to or characteristic of the employment.
Moreover, occupational disease is redefined by mandating that it
be "due in a material degree" to the employment conditions "or place
of employment. '2 3 Although no definition of "material degree" is
provided by section 34:15-31, the term is defined in section 34:15-7.2
of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 24 the new heart claim provision, to mean "an appreciable degree or a degree substantially greater
than de minimis." 2 5 Using accepted rules of statutory construction,
the term will probably be given the same meaning in section 34:1531 .28 In any event, there is a further requirement of proof beyond that
previously demanded. Now, a petitioner must presumably show a
greater nexus between the malady and the employment. Exactly how
much greater remains to be determined, but it was certainly intended
that many disabilities resulting from an employee's individual intolerances be removed from coverage under the Act.2 7 The amended
definition also expressly excludes from compensability degenerative
changes due to the natural process of aging.2 8 This does not apply to
the situation in which disability has been triggered by a specific
traumatic event. Rather, it addresses the case where a worker has had
a history of possibly arduous employment, at the twilight of which he
experiences disabilities that were not present earlier. Under the revised definition, these problems may not be the result of an occupational disease. Instead, they may be the result of the normal wear and
tear of everyday life, or deterioration due to the natural process of
aging. If the condition is of the latter character, it is not compensable
even though a real functional disability exists.
The deterioration referred to in section 31:15-31(b) must be assumed to mean something more than the employer credit granted for
preexisting disabilities under section 34:15-12(d) of the New Jersey
23 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-31(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.2 (%Vest Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
' Id. This criteria of compensability established is a substantial departure from the criteria
for heart claims in the case of Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161 (1962).
2 See Oldfield v. New Jersey Realty Co., 1 N.J. 63, 69, 61 A.2d 767, 770 (1948).
11 Conversely, it should be noted that the insertion of the phrase "place of'" in the definition
of occupational disease technically expands the definition. Diseases characteristic of or peculiar
to a place of employment are also now specifically compensable. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-31(a)
(Vest Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
2'Id. § 34:15-31(b).
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Statutes Annotated. 2 9 Under section 34:15-12(d) of the new Act,
employers will receive a credit for an employee's prior loss of function
involving the same body part subsequently affected by a compensable
occupational disease.30 In what represents a significant departure
from prior law, this credit will be applied regardless of whether the
earlier injury was compensated. 3 ' This amendment effectively modifies the long established principle that "an employer takes an employee as he finds him," with all his personal infirmities, and is
responsible for the end result of an occupational disease or accident
acting upon those infirmities.3 2 The burden of proof is on the employer to establish the preexisting disability.3 3 If successful, the em-

ployer is liable only for the later injury, despite the fact that the
resultant cumulative disability may be greater than the compensation
afforded the later injury alone.
In the past, a dollar credit was extended for prior compensation
which was paid involving the same part of the body. Now, however,
the credit is given "for the previous loss of function.1 34 Although the

precise nature of the credit is not made explicit in the statute, it would
seem that to achieve the full intent of the changes, the overall disability must first be computed. The employer would then receive a credit
measured by the number of weeks of disability that would be payable
for the degree of preexisting loss under the new schedule. Compensation would be granted for the difference between the overall disability
and the preexisting disability. For example, if a petitioner had an
overall disability of sixty-percent of partial total at the maximum rate
in 1980, he would be entitled to over $53,000. Assuming the employer
is entitled to a credit for twenty-percent of partial total for preexisting
disability, the credit would be computed, following the new schedule,
at about $6,000, resulting in a net award to the petitioner of approximately $47,000. The disability attributable to the employment should
not be stated as the difference between the overall disability and the
29 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-12(d) (Vest

Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). The statute provides in

part:
If previous loss of function to the body.
is established by competent evidence, and
subsequently an injury or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of
employment occurs to that part of the body, . . . where there was previous loss of
function, . . .credit shall be given the employer . . . for the previous loss of function.

Id.

30 Id. Section 34:15-12(d) was amended to include occupational diseases, but this does not
represent a substantive change in the application of the Act.
31 Id.
'" Belth v. Anthony Ferrante & Son Inc., 47 N.J. 38, 219 A.2d 168 (1968).
33 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-12(d).
34 Id.
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credit, or forty-percent of partial total, because this would result in
the petitioner receiving only about $23,500, or less than half of what

he is entitled to. Overall disability should be used insomuch as the
work related injury moved the petitioner from a twenty-percent disability to a sixty-percent disability and the employer should pay compensation for the equivalent value of that disability.
Because the employer's credit is for the loss of function and not a
dollar credit for prior compensation paid, a problem arises in its
application to occupational disease claims. The problem is exempli-

fied in the case where a worker who was adjudicated disabled under
the old law files for additional exposure under the new law. This

claimant will receive less total compensation than that paid to a
worker with the same overall disability who simply files and receives
compensation once under the new law. Notwithstanding the apparent
inequity, this result is necessary. Were it otherwise, in the multiple

employer situation the last employer would be subsidizing the prior
employers by bringing the payments made before 1980 up to the
compensation rate under the amendments.
As stated earlier, the amendment to section 34:15-12(d) modifies
the doctrine that the employer takes the employee as he finds him, a
fundamental concept which has been the underpinning of a legion of
judicial decisions in New Jersey.3 5 It also eliminates a conflict which
had existed between that doctrine and the Second Injury Fund.30 For
if an employer takes an employee as he finds him and is responsible for
the end result after an accident or occupational disease, it would seem

35 See, e.g., Belth v. Anthony Ferrante & Son, Inc., 47 N.J. 38, 219 A.2d 168 (1966).
When an employee is admitted to an employer's work force, he makes no warranty
of physical or mental fitness, or freedom from latent or patent disability or disease.
The employer takes him as he is, handicapped by any physical impairments,
whether or not observable, as well as to any underlying condition or any unusual
susceptibility or idiosyncrasy or quiescent disease, which when subjected to accidental work-connected injury acting on the already existing impairment or condition or
disease produces greater disability than would follow if such impaired physical
condition or weakness were not present. In such cases if a compensable injury acting
in the already existing impairment or condition or disease produces greater disability
than might ordinarily flow therefrom, it has been held uniformly that the award of
workmen's compensation must equal the full extent of the impairment.
Id. at 45-46, 219 A.2d at 171.
36 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-94 to -95.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). The Second Injury
Fund (formerly known as the One Percent Fund or the Two Percent Fund) is a reinsurance
mechanism which attempts to mitigate the impact on employers of awards to workers for
permanent and total disabilities resulting from the combined effects of a work-related injury and
a prior disability. Its purpose is to "encourage the hiring by industry of people handicapped by
pre-existing diabilities." Paul v. Baltimore Upholstery Co., 66 N.J. 111, 129, 328 A.2d 610, 620
(1974). For a discussion of the legislative history and intent of the Second Injury Fund, see
Ratsch v. Holderman, 31 N.J. 458, 468-471, 158 A.2d 24, 30-32 (1960) (Burling, J., dissenting).
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unnecessary for the Fund to be responsible for any of the preexisting
injury. The elimination of this conflict should facilitate determina-

tions of Fund eligibility. The amendments will also place a greater
financial burden on the Fund because conditions which were previously the sole responsibility of the employer by virtue of their aggravation will now be divided between the Fund and the employer due to
the credit in section 34:15-12(d) and due to the elimination of aggravation of a pre-existing condition as a basis for denial of Fund benefits. 37
PARTIAL PERMANENT DISABILITY DEFINED

Prior to the reform Act, there was no statutory definition of
partial permanent disability. Perhaps the most profound legislative
change affecting occupational disease claims is the enactment of section 34:15-36 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated,3 8 which defines
this phrase. The definition was judicially expressed in Everhardt v.
Newark Cleaning & Dyeing Co. 39 as "the loss ensuing from personal
injury which detracts from the 'former efficiency' of the workman's
'body or its member in the ordinary pursuits of life. '"' 40 Once proven
to be occupationally related, most diseases under the old law were
treated as compensable provided there were permanent changes associated with the disease. Litigation often centered around the existence
of the disease or lack thereof, and its relation to the employment. 4'

31The deletion by the reform act of subsection (b) of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-95 represents a
significant change in the applicability of the Second Injury Fund. Subsection (b) had previously
protected the Fund from responsibility for permanent total disability resulting from the aggravation of a previous disability by the last compensable injury. Lewicki v. New Jersey Art Foundry,
88 N.J. 75, 85, 438 A.2d 544, 549 (1981).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982) provides in part:
Disability permanent in quality and partial in character means a permanent
impairment caused by a compensable accident or compensable occupational disease,
based upon demonstrable objective medical evidence, which restricts the function of
the body or of its members or organs; included in the criteria which shall be
considered shall be whether there has been a lessening to a material degree of an
employee's working ability. Subject to the above provisions nothing in this definition
shall be construed to preclude benefits to a worker who returns to work following a
compensable accident even if there be no reduction in earnings. Injuries such as
minor lacerations, minor contusions, minor sprains, and scars which do not constitute significant permanent disfigurement, and occupational disease of a minor nature such as mild dermatitis and mild bronchitis shall not constitute permanent
disability within the meaning of this definition.
Id.
., 119 N.J.L. 108, 194 A. 294 (1937).
40 Id. at 111, 194 A. at 296.
41 See, e.g., Bondar v. Simmons Co., 23 N.J. Super. 109, 92 A.2d 642 (App. Div.), ajfd, 12
N.J. 361, 96 A.2d 795 (1953).
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Now, however, even after a disease is found to be present and occupationally related, there may be no partial permanent disability. The
new definition of partial permanent disability will severely limit
awards for compensable occupational diseases and, for that matter,
42
accidents.
Under the statutory definition, partial permanent disability is a
"permanent impairment. . . which restricts the function of the body
or of its members or organs. ' 43 Partial permanent disability is now not
simply a loss which detracts from the body or its members. 44 Furthermore, the new definition considers "whether there has been a lessening to a material degree of an employee's working ability, ' 45 rather
than whether there has been a lessening of the employee's efficiency
"in the ordinary pursuits of life." ' 46 While these proscriptions might
be thought to strictly require a functional loss, to the exclusion of
purely cosmetic disabilities, this cannot be the case because scarring
will constitute partial permanent disability provided it constitutes a
"significant permanent disfigurement." ' 47
More significantly, the statute states that "occupational diseases
of a minor nature such as mild dermatitis and mild bronchitis shall not
constitute permanent disability." 48 Thus, a condition may meet the
more restrictive definition of occupational disease, yet not give rise to
a partial permanent disability. There is theoretically a threshold under which a disease, though disabling, is not compensable. This
threshold applies to all occupational diseases. Merely changing terminology by calling chronic bronchitis "chronic obstructive lung disease"
will not circumvent the requirements of section 34:15-36. The actual
definition of "minor" will undoubtedly become a matter of controversy which will be decided in the courts.
The definition of partial permanent disability also requires that
the impairment be "based upon demonstrable objective medical evidence." 49 As indicated in the statement accompanying the New Jersey Senate Committee Substitute Bill, which was eventually enacted,
"objective medical evidence is understood to mean evidence exceeding
the subjective statement of the petitioner." 50 Presumably, subjective
12 The statutory language expressly excludes from the definition "injuries such as minor
lacerations, minor contusions, minor sprains, and scars." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36.
43 Id.
4' See Everhardt, 119 N.J.L. at 111, 194 A. at 296.
45N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36.
16 Everhardt, 119 N.J.L. at 111, 194 A. at 296.
47 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36.
4' Id.
40 Id.
' JOINT STATEIENT, supra note 2, at 2.
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proofs, such as the complaints of a petitioner, no matter how believable, will not suffice to establish partial permanent disability. There
must be "objective medical evidence" of restriction of the function of
the body or its members or organs. This will demand that doctors
change the emphasis and format of their reports so as to indicate in
detail objective restrictions rather than subjective ones. If a doctor's
report does not indicate positive objective restrictions, it cannot be a
basis for a finding of partial permanent disability under this new
definition.
JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS REGARDING
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIMS

A third major revision concerning the compensability of occupational disease claims deals with the jurisdictional limitations imposed
on the workers' compensation court through the amendment to section 34:15-34 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated.5' Under the law,
occupational claims generally have to be filed within two years after
52
discovery of the disability and its relationship to the employment.
Because in many instances the symptoms of occupational illnesses
would not surface for many years, claims could be brought long after
the petitioner was exposed to the cause of the disease. The amendment
adds the following language to the statute to clarify the 1974 amendment:
It is the express intention of the Legislature that, except in any case
where claim is made for asbestosis, radiation poisoning, siderosis,
anthracosis, silicosis, mercury poisoning, beryllium poisoning,
chrome poisoning, lead poisoning or any occupational disease having the same characteristics of the above enumerated diseases as
subsequently determined by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the provisions of this section shall not be
applied retroactively but shall be applied only to those employees
who shall cease to have been exposed in the course of employment
to causes of compensable occupational diseases as defined in 34:153
31(a) subsequent to January 1, 1980.5

51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-34 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). Prior to July 3, 1974, this
statutory provision limited the compensation courts' jurisdiction to claims filed within two years
of last exposure or one year after the employee knew or should have known the nature of the
disability and its relationship to the employment, but in no event later than five years after
exposure. 1948 N.J. Pub. L. No. 468. This language was changed in 1974 to the present statutory
language. 1974 N.J. Pub. L. No. 65. The recent amendment does not change the statutory
language but merely expresses the intention of the legislature of the statutorily language enacted
in 1974.
11 See Panzino v. Continental Can Co., 71 N.J. 298, 364 A.2d 1043 (1976).
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-34.
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As a result of this amendment, the application of section 34:15-34
is limited to exposures ending subsequent to January 1, 1980 and will
not be applied retroactively except for certain specifically listed diseases or those with similar characteristics. 54 This obviously attempts
to curtail the open-ended jurisdiction for occupational claims recognized in Panzino v. Continental Can Co. 5 In fact, according to the
statement accompanying the Senate Committee Substitute Bill, the
1979 amendment to section 34:15-34 amendment attempted to limit
jurisdiction to only those diseases with a latency period between exposure and the onset of symptomatology. 50 Yet, not all the specified
diseases involve such a latency period. Lead and chrome poisoning do
not involve a symptomless period after exposure. On the contrary,
when the exposure is significant enough, damage is caused without
any real latent period. The meaning of the catch-all phrase in the
amendment, "having the same characteristics" as the named diseases,
is, therefore, ambiguous since all of the named diseases do not involve
latent conditions. The liberal construction doctrine should allow the
widest possible construction to this catch-all phrase so that jurisdiction
will be found in as many cases as possible. With the narrowed definition of occupational disease and the further limitation on compensability imposed by the definition of permanent partial disability, it
would seem unnecessary to further eliminate cases meeting these tests
by limiting the jurisdiction of the court. An occupational disease claim
meeting the two former tests should be compensated.

Id. This list of occupational diseases includes some of the conditions listed in section 34:1531 before the 1938 amendment which created the general occupational disease definition. Prior
to the 1938 amendment, the following conditions were classified as occupational diseases:
anthrax, lead poisoning, mercury poisoning, arsenic poisoning, phosphorous poisoning, benzene
poisoning, wood alcohol poisoning, chrome poisoning, caisson poisoning, and radium poisoning.
See id. § 34:15-31 (West 1959).
35 71 N.J. 298, 364 A.2d 1043 (1976). In Panzino, the petitioner filed an occupational
hearing loss claim six years after his retirement from respondent corporation, but within one
month after discovery that the loss was work-related. Under the existing jurisdictional limitations, the claim would have been barred because the employee's last occupational exposure was
more than five years prior to the filing of a claim. By applying the 1974 amendment to section
34:15-34, which became effective two months before the hearing, the court held that petitioner's
claim was retroactively valid:
Experience has revealed that by their very nature occupational diseases often do not
become manifest until years after exposure.. .. Accordingly, we conclude that the

[1974] enactment should be read to cover any claimant who files a petition within
two years of the date on which he learns of the nature of his disability and its relation
to his employment.
Id. at 302, 364 A.2d at 1045.
36 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 2.
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As to diseases not of the same character as those listed, the
amendment to section 34:15-34 provides that the section will apply
only to exposures ending subsequent to January 1, 1980. 57 If an
occupational exposure continues beyond January 1, 1980, the section
34:15-34 filing provisions will apply even though the disease is not
listed within the special category. 58 The amending language, however, can mean no more than that there is a different filing requirement for exposures ceasing before January 1, 1980. It does not deal
with the right to file a claim petition, but only when a claim must be
filed for the court to have jurisdiction. The question which necessarily
follows if section 34:15-34 does not apply concerns the filing requirement for occupational diseases which are not within the special category and in which the exposure ended prior to 1980. The beginning
sentence of section 34:15-34 suggests that the time limit for filing
would be provided by section 34:15-51 of the New Jersey Statutes
Annotated, 59 which is two years from the date of the accident or last
payment of compensation.60 Nevertheless, it would seem difficult to
apply language dealing with accidental injury to occupational diseases.
Another possibility is to apply the section 34:15-34 language in
effect prior to its amendment in 1974. The filing limitation at that
time was two years from the date of last exposure or one year after the
employee knew or should have known the nature of his disability and
its relation to the employment, but in no event later than five years
after exposure.6 1 Since this language was changed to its present form
by the 1974 amendment, effective July 3, 1974, any claims in which
exposure ended after that date would dictate the application of the
present wording of section 34:15-34; but such an interpretation would
violate the expressed intention of the 1979 amendment.62 An intention to apply section 34:15-34 to exposures ceasing after July 3, 1974,
rather than those ceasing after January 1, 1980, would be a more
intellectually consistent approach because the language came into
effect in 1974.

57 N.J. SrAT. ANN. § 34:15-34.
5 Id.

59 Id. § 34:15-51.
60 Id. § 34:15-34.
61 1948 N.J. Pub. L. No. 468.
62 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-34.
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Further confusion regarding the application of the section 34:1534 filing requirements ensues as a result of the incorporation of this

section 63 into the new occupational hearing loss provisions. 4 According to the dictates of section 34:15-34, the section will not be applicable to those hearing loss cases in which exposure does not extend into
1980.65 By its terms, however, the Hearing Loss Act also provides
that it is to be applied retroactively "where practicable" to all cases

pending in the division of workers' compensation. 6 Presumably, this
would include cases where exposure ended or disability manifested
similarly awaits
prior to January 1, 1980. This statutory incongruity
67
reconstruction.
legislative
or
interpretation
judicial
In light of this quandary, one must wonder why section 34:15-34
was not amended in its entirety, instead of simply adding a declaration of intention as to the meaning of language which has been present
since 1974. The expressed intent is obviously inconsistent with the

0' See id. § 34:15-35.19.
b Id. § 34:15-35.10 to -35.22 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). This enactment marks New
Jersey's first attempt at setting forth specific guidelines for compensating employees for occupational hearing loss. The Act standardizes the method of determining the percentage of hearing
disability and increases the rate of compensation for occupational hearing loss, while eliminating
compensation for lesser impairments. When deafness due to a loud noise suddenly occurs, it is
usually the result of an accident or explosion. This type of acoustic trauma does not fall within
the provisions of the hearing loss act, but rather is compensated under the general provisions of
the compensation act for accidental injuries.
'
See id. § 34:15-35.19.
1979 N.J. Pub. L. No. 285, § 15 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-35.10 (West Cum.
Supp. 1980-1981)). The new law provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
This act shall take effect on the sixtieth day after its enactment and, where practicable, shall apply to all actions instituted thereafter, and to all proceedings taken
subsequent thereto in all actions pending on such effective date; except that judgments theretofore entered or awards theretofore made pursuant to law shall not be
affected by this act.
Id.
The clear intent of section 15 of the Hearing Loss Act, 1979 PUB. L. No. 285, § 15, is that
the new standards for evaluation of hearing loss be applied to all cases pending in the division of
workers' compensation. The legislature is watching and will review the application of all of the
1979 amendments. Under the terms of the 1980 reform act, the director of the division of
workers' compensation must report to the legislature regarding the success in achieving the aims
of this legislation. See JOINT STAT ENT, supra note 2. Further legislative revisions will undoubtedly occur if determinations do not comport with such clear pronouncements.
Use of the "where practicable" clause to ignore a retroactive application to the hearing loss
provisions is not suggested here. This clause, instead, should be used to alleviate any hardships or
impractical proof requirements of the new Act. For example, new examinations may not be
required even though readings at three thousand hertz were not taken. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:15-35.15. If no decibel readings for a place of employment are available, it may not be
practicable to require them. See id. § 34:15-35.11(e). It could also mean that additional time
may be needed to complete discovery. The "where practicable" clause should not, however,
work to avoid the application of the act.
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plain wording of the unchanged language which appears to make the
filing requirement in section 34 applicable to all diseases, not just
those enumerated by the amendment or those where exposure ended
after January 1, 1980. Moreover, the expressed intent does not supply
a filing requirement in and of itself. Because circumstances exist under
which the statute may not reasonably operate, a court might well
conclude that if the legislature wants section 34 to mean something
else it will have to amend the wording to so state, rather than simply
add an expressed intention. Therefore, the appended expressed intention may be insufficient to change the Supreme Court of New Jersey's
interpretation of section 34.88
EXPANDED EMPLOYER DEFENSES

Another major revision adds as an employer defense the willful
failure of an employee to use a required protective device. When an
employee fails to use a protective device and an injury results, that
injury will not be compensable if six factors are satisfied: the failure to
use the device must be willful; the device must be furnished by the
employer; the device must have clearly been a requirement of the
employment; the requirement must have been uniformly enforced;
repeated warnings by the employer can be documented; and the
failure to use the device is the proximate cause of the injury. 9 The
employer has the burden of proof to establish the requirements of this
defense. By returning to a consideration of fault concepts, this defense
can insulate employers from liability for occupational diseases when
the requirements can be met through documentary proof.
MULTIPLE OCCUPATIONAL CLAIMS

A final legislative provision in the Act which affects primarily
occupational claims is the new requirement that weeks of disability
are not cumulative where more than one disability is alleged in a
single claim petition. 70 It is a common practice by some attorneys to
allege all occupational disabilities a petitioner may have in one claim
petition. Under the new Act the compensation rate for each of the
disabilities, for example, pulmonary and loss of hearing, is to be
determined by beginning at the first week in the schedule for each
disability separately. 7' The weeks should not be added together to

" See Panzino v. Continental Can Co., 71 N.J. 298, 364 A.2d 1043 (1976); note 55 supra.

60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.
70 Id. § 34:15-12(c).
71 Id.
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determine the average rate over the number of weeks of the award.
This is appropriate so that the petitioner receives the same award as
the petitioner who files separate compensation claims for each disability. Indeed, the latter filing practice is to be encouraged because it
gives a more accurate picture of the disabilities being claimed and
adjudicated in The Division of Workers' Compensation.
The term "disability" in this subsection, however, should not be
confused with the separate elements of a disability flowing from a
single traumatic event. A worker may as a result of an accident suffer
disability which includes orthopedic injuries, neuropsychiatric injuries, and other injuries. It would be incorrect to interpret the language
in section 34:15-12(c) to mean that in such an accident the rate of
compensation is determined by beginning with the first week in the
schedule for each of the elements of the disability. The severely injured worker should be compensated at a progessively higher rate
depending on the severity of the injury. If the injury is comprised of
several elements, as most severe injuries are, the benefits of the higher
rate would be withheld from petitioner by determining the compensation rate from the beginning of the schedule for each element within
the disability. On the contrary, the new section 34:15-12(c) is concerned only with negating any advantage resulting from the misjoinder of more than one disability in a single claim petition. A claim for
compensation for one accidental injury, though the disability may
take several forms, is a single claim for disability flowing from the
single accident. The section 34:15-12(c) provision has no applicability
to a claim alleging one compensable accident.
CONCLUSION

The workers' compensation amendments of 1979 will act to restrict the compensability of occupational disease claims. The narrowed definition of occupational disease, the further limitation imposed by the definition of partial permanent disability, new
jurisdictional constraints, and expanded employer defenses will
present serious hurdles to the compensation petitioner. The Act itself
has raised questions regarding its ultimate impact. While this Article
may not resolve these questions, it is hoped that the discussion of these
issues will stimulate arguments in the hearing process so that the
worthwhile development of compensation law in New Jersey will
continue.

